

VZCZCXRO6642
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0568/01 1050609
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 140609Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0547
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0153
RHMFISS/CJTTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000568

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [KPKO](#) [SOCI](#) [AU](#) [UNSC](#) [SU](#)
SUBJECT: WE NEED A CEASEFIRE COMMISSION, SAYS FRUSTRATED DPA
SIGNATORY GROUP

REF: (A) KHARTOUM 557

(B) KHARTOUM 538

¶1. (U) SUMMARY: On April 9, three members of SLM-Free Will (SLM-FW) informed emboffs about recent Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) bombings in their areas of control in North Darfur, emphasizing that there is no mechanism for them to report these incidents, since the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) remains dormant. The SLM-FW leaders, including one former AMIS CFC member, appeared confused about how to inform UNAMID of ceasefire violations, complaining that UNAMID ignores their reports and that they no longer have access to the UNAMID compound and its leaders. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (SBU) On April 9, Abdalla Eisa Abdalla, a rebel commander in the Abu Garan sector of North Darfur (SLM-FW's main area of control); Jouda Adam Fadul Jouda, a SLM-FW CFC representative; and Abdalla Bedairi (aka Bedairi Adam Bedairi), another SLM-FW military commander, came to the Embassy field office in El-Fasher. Abdalla opened the meeting stating that "the recent events in North Darfur have pushed us to come to speak to you, as things are getting worse." Abdalla stated that he is very worried about the recent janjaweed shootings in the El-Fasher market and a number of bombings in the north (reftel).

SAF BOMBINGS IN THE NORTH

¶3. (SBU) The SLM-FW leaders reported that at approximately 16:30 on April 8, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) planes bombed SLM-FW areas in Mellit, Mado, Sayah, and the Abu Garan Mountains. They stated that there were no casualties resulting from these bombings. They added that the Government of Sudan (GoS) has a special interest in the lattermost area, as the mountains provide protection for a large number of people there, many of whom the GoS believes are rebels. The SLM-FW leaders insisted that only civilians are living in these areas and that the GoS bombing of these areas shows its lack of regard for signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).

¶4. (SBU) According to the SLM-FW reps, the April 8 bombings follow other SAF bombings in these northern areas. They reported that approximately ten to 15 days earlier, SAF airplanes bombed Abu Garan and Mado, killing two children and razing one house [NOTE: Separate sources confirmed the Mado bombing. On April 4, one Italian employee of Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI) told emboff that during a recent survey trip to North Darfur, he passed through Mado "only two hours after it was bombed, when the smoke was still rising from the earth." This INGO worker added that "It makes no sense to bomb a village that has absolutely nothing, as the value of all the possessions in the village was probably less than the cost of the bombs." END NOTE]. SLM-FW rep Abdalla stated that "the government bombs areas irrespective as to whether they are controlled by the signatories or non-signatories of the DPA."

NEED FOR CEASEFIRE COMMISSION

15. (U) The SLM-FW representatives stated that they had not reported the bombings in their areas to anyone before the meeting with the emboffs. They said that they previously sent many reports of such violations to UNAMID, but "that all the reports all have been ignored." Jouda, SLM-FW's representative to the CFC, specifically complained that his access to the UNAMID compound (and to its leadership) had been cut off since AMIS's authority was transferred to UNAMID on January 1st. These leaders also said that UNAMID needs to travel to remote areas to access civilians in need, and stated that neither AMIS nor UNAMID has been effective in areas that are not controlled by the GoS.

16. (SBU) Emboffs agreed that there is an urgent need to re-invigorate the CFC and that all incidents should be reported to the Force Commander and his Deputy. Emboffs agreed to facilitate passing on this information to UNAMID leadership and to help provide SLM-FW with appropriate contact information at UNAMID. Emboffs also stressed that SLM-FW as a DPA signatory had a responsibility to be proactive in reporting these incidents and following up with UNAMID on its own.

COMMENT

17. (SBU) It is notable that these DPA signatories see the small U.S. Embassy presence in Darfur as more accessible, receptive, and able to act on information about ceasefire violations than the large UNAMID contingent. Although SLM-FW is not a serious force on the ground, their criticism of the non-functional CFC follow other complaints by larger DPA signatory groups. Restarting the CFC must be a top priority for senior UNAMID leaders. Until the CFC is re-started, it is important to empower the DPA signatories to be proactive in reporting directly to UNAMID or they may ultimately

KHARTOUM 00000568 002 OF 002

follow the path of the non-signatories.

FERNANDEZ